I am an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School. I study the design of legal and political institutions. My research focuses on corporate governance, corporate misconduct, contract theory, and voting procedures.
[University of Wisconsin] [LinkedIn] [Google Scholar]
Academic Affiliations
University of Wisconsin Law School, Assistant Professor, 2021-
ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics, Research Affiliate, 2021- ; Postdoctoral Scholar, 2019-2021
Education
Ph.D., Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2019
J.D., Stanford Law School, 2018
B.A., Oregon State University, 2011
Publications
(1) “Designing Remedies to Compensate Plaintiffs for Unobservable Harms.” American Law and Economics Review, 2018. [ALER]
(2) “If Not the Index Funds, Then Who?” Berkeley Business Law Journal, 2020. [BBLJ] [Featured on Columbia Blue Sky Blog]
(3) “Profiting from Pollution” Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin, 2023 [Replication Files] [JREG] [Featured on Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance]
(4) “Corporate Liability, Collateral Consequences, and Capital Structure“ (Columbia Business Law Review, 2023) [CBLR] [Featured on ProMarket]
(5) “Beyond the Spoiler Effect: Can Ranked Choice Voting Solve the Problem of Political Polarization?” (with Edward B. Foley and Scott C. Ganz), (forthcoming, University of Illinois Law Review) [SSRN] [Featured on the Election Law Blog]
(6) “Robust Electoral Competition: Rethinking Electoral Systems to Encourage Representative Outcomes” (with Scott C. Ganz), (forthcoming, University of Maryland Law Review) [SSRN] [Featured on the Election Law Blog]
(7) “The Strong Maximum Circulation Algorithm: A New Method for Aggregating Preference Rankings” (with Scott C. Ganz, Dorit S. Hochbaum, and James B. Orlin), (forthcoming, INFORMS Journal on Optimization)
Working Papers
(8) “Mandatory Equity Issuances as a First-Best Solution to Punishing Corporate Misconduct,” R&R at Journal of Law and Economics.
(9) “Norm-Based Enforcement of Promises” (with Rebecca Stone and Alexander Stremitzer), R&R at Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
Works in Progress (Coming Soon)
(10) “Why “Good” Corporate Governance is Not Always Good” (with Anat Admati and Paul Pfleiderer).
(11) “Corporate Misconduct by the Numbers” (with Aneesh Raghunandan).
(12) “Top-Two Runoff Elections (Uniquely) Dominate Plurality Rule” (with Ezra Friedman).
(13) “Supermajority Rules, Gerrymandering, and Voter Suppression: An Equivalence Relation” (with Michael Gilbert).
Research Reports
(14) “A Simple Agent-Based Model for Simulating Single Winner Elections” (with Scott Ganz and John Mantus)
Teaching
Business Organizations, Contract Law, Contract Theory and Design
Coauthors
Anat Admati (Stanford), Ned Foley (Ohio State), Ezra Friedman (Northwestern), Scott Ganz (Georgetown, AEI), Michael Gilbert (University of Virginia), Dorit Hochbaum (UC Berkeley), John Mantus (Carnegie Mellon), Jim Orlin (MIT), Paul Pfleiderer (Stanford), Aneesh Raghunandan (Yale), Rebecca Stone (UCLA), Alexander Stremitzer (ETH Zurich)
